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The  fiftieth  anniversary  of  the  signing  of  the  Articles  of 
Agreement  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World 
Bank  was  celebrated  at meetings  in Washington,  DC:  at  Bretton 
Woods,  New  Hampshire;  and  at  the  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Boards  of 
Governors  of  the  two  institutions  held  in Madrid.[l]  As  one  of 
the  few  survivors  who  participated  in  the  1944  Bretton  Woods 
conference,  I was  privileged  to  attend  the  first  two 
commemorations  (Mikesell,  1994).  The  many  addresses  at  the  1994 
meetings  praising  the  contributions  of  the  Fund  and  Bank  were 
overshadowed  by  the  widely-held  conviction  that  both  institutions 
are  seriously  in  need  of  overhauling.  However,  there  is  no 
consensus  on  how  they  should  be  changed.  Some  believe  that  one 
or  both  have  outlived  their  usefulness  and  should  be  abolished, 
while  others  believe  the  institutions  should  continue  to  operate 
as  in  the  past,  but  with  new  responsibilities  and  enhanced 
resources. 
This  Working  Paper  is 
major  changes  in the  Fund, 
--- 
mainly  concerned  with  proposals  for 
but  because  the  proposals  are  also 
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related  to  the  operations  of  the  Bank,  a brief  background 
on  both  institutions  follows. 
The  World  Financial  System  After  Bretton  Woods 
The  Fund  and  Bank  were  designed  to  avoid  the  chaotic 
financial  conditions  that  prevailed  during  the  1930s  by 
facilitating  the  transition  to  a post-World  War  II  economy 
characterized  by  stable  exchange  rates,  no  exchange  restrictions 
on  trade,  and  the  availability  of  capital  for  financing  postwar 
reconstruction  and  the  development  of  poor  countries.  The  IMF 
was  expected  to  promote  a new  international  monetary  order  by 
establishing  and  enforcing  rules  governing  exchange  rates  and 
foreign  exchange  transactions,  and  by  providing  assistance  to 
countries  in  conforming  to  these  rules.  Owing  to  the  magnitude 
of  the  financial  requirements  for  reconstruction  and  to  the 
balance  of  payments  problems  of  the  European  countries,  neither 
the  Fund  nor  the  Bank  played  a significant  -role in  the  transition 
period.  The  Marshall  Plan  provided  most  of  the  financing  for 
European  recovery,  and  the  European  Payments  Union  (EPU) 
established  a payments  system  that  permitted  multilateral  intra- 
European  trade,  and  paved  the  way  for  initiating  the  IMF  par 
value  system  in the  1960s. 
By  the  end  of  the  196Os,  the  principal  threat  to  the  par 
value  system  based  on  the  gold-convertible  dollar  was  the 
weakness  of  the  dollar  itself.  World  recovery  brought  about  a 
change  in trade  patterns  and  capital  markets,  so  that  the  "dollar 
shortage"  of  the  1950s  was  followed  by  a dollar  surplus  in  the J 
late  1960s.  The  termination  of  dollar  convertibility  into  gold 
in  1971  and  the  1973  abandonment  of  efforts  to  maintain  fixed 
rates  by  the  major  countries  left  the  IMF  with  little  influence 
on  the  international  monetary  system.  The  Bretton  Woods  monetary 
system  was  dead  and  few  expected  it  to  be  revived. 
The  IMF  found  its  niche  by  providing  advice  and  making 
loans  to  developing  countries  under  a variety  of  programs 
involving  different  maturities  and  interest  rates.  These  loans 
had  little  to  do  with  exchange  rate  stability,  and,  in  fact,  the 
preloan  agreements  often  required  devaluation  along  with  trade 
and  exchange  liberalization.  Although  some  of  the  loans  assisted 
countries  in periods  of  crisis  resulting  from  sudden  declines  in 
export  income,  most  were  designed  to  induce  countries  to  reform 
the  economic  policies  that  had  contributed  to  their  balance  of 
payments  equilibrium. 
Since  it began  operations  in  1946,  the  World  Bank  has  been 
almost  completely  occupied  with  assisting  developing  countries. 
Although  its  charter  emphasized  the  Bank's  role  in  promoting  the 
flow  of  private  capital,  the  bulk  of  its  loans  have  been  made  to 
governments.  During  the  195Os,  the  Bank's  lending  was  hampered 
by  a  shortage  of  projects  that  met  the  standards  of  commercial 
bank  loans  as  interpreted  by  successive  Bank  presidents,  all  of 
whom  (except  for  Robert  McNamara)  were  from  the  American  banking 
community.  In  the  beginning,  most  Bank  loans  were  for  specific 
infrastructure  projects  such  as  large  dams,  power,  and 
transportation.  The  idea  slowly  emerged  that  the  Bank  should  be 4 
a development  institution  concerned  with  social  welfare  and 
eliminating  poverty,  as  well  as  with  promoting  the  conditions  for 
economic  growth. 
The  lending  capacities  of  both  the  Fund  and  Bank  have  been 
increased  steadily  since  their  inauguration  in  1946.  Outstanding 
credits  provided  by  the  Fund  as  of  the  end  of  FY  1994  totalled 
about  $56  billion  and  disbursements  during  FY  1995  were 
$17  billion.  In  addition,  the  Fund  has  allocated  to  its  members 
21 billion  SDRs,  which  they  can  use  to  buy  the  currencies  of 
other  members  (as  of  May  1995,  one  SDR  =  $1.47).[2]  The  Fund's 
lending  resources  have  grown  with  periodic  increases  in member 
quotas,  which  determine  both  the  subscriptions  to  the  Fund's 
capital  and  how  much  members  can  normally  borrow. 
World  Bank  loans  outstanding  at  the  end  of  FY  1995  were  $120 
billion,  and  the  Bank  made  commitments  of  $17  billion  during  FY 
1995.  In  addition,  the  Bank  manages  the  International 
Development  Association  (IDA),  which  loaned  approximately 
$5.7  billion  in  FY  1994.  Another  associate  of  the  Bank,  the 
International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC),  provides  equity  and  debt 
financing  to  private  enterprise  in  developing  countries.  In  FY 
1995  it  committed  $2.9  billion.  The  fourth  and  youngest 
associate,  the  Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency  (MIGA), 
promotes  foreign  direct  investment  in  developing  countries  by 
offering  political  risk  investment  insurance.  The  World  Bank  and 
IDA  operate  under  the  same  management,  but  with  different  sources 5 
of  funding.  The  IFC  and  MIGA  have  separate  managements. 
Together  these  institutions  make  up  the  World  Bank  Group  (WBG). 
Dissatisfaction  with  the  Fund's  current  functions  has  arisen 
from  three  major  sources.  First,  for  more  than  two  decades  since 
the  abandonment  of  the  par  value  system  established  at  Bretton 
Woods,  the  Fund  has  not  played  a significant  role  in  guiding  or 
influencing  the  international  monetary  system.  Second,  there  is 
considerable  dissatisfaction  with  the  present  floating  exchange 
rate  system  on  the  grounds  that  there  is  excessive  fluctuation  in 
the  exchange  values  of  the  major  currencies,  and  these 
fluctuations  have  not  resulted  in  satisfactory  balance  of 
payments  adjustments.  Third,  the  Fund's  assistance  to  developing 
countries,  which  has  constituted  almost  the  entire  use  of  its 
resources,  has  not  prevented  financial  crises,  such  as  that 
occurring  in Mexico  in  1994,  and  much  of  its  assistance  and 
advice  duplicates  that  provided  by  the  World  Bank. 
Proposals  for  dealing  with  the  role  of  the  Fund  in  the 
international  monetary  system  reflect  two  opposing  positions 
among  international  economists  and  government  officials.  One  is 
that  there  should  be  a new  international  monetary  system 
characterized  by  relative  exchange  rate  stability,  and  that  the 
Fund  should  play  a major  role  in the  creation  and  management  of 
the  new  system.  The  opposing  position  is that  the  floating  rate 
system  has  worked  reasonably  well  for  the  past  two  decades  and 
that  a new  system  involving  major  commitments  by  the  leading 
financial  powers  is  neither  feasible  nor  desirable.  Some  of 6 
those  holding  the  latter  position  propose  terminating  the  Fund  as 
an  independent  institution. 
The  proposals  for  changing  the  role  of  the  Fund  in  assisting 
developing  countries  also  reflect  two  opposing  positions.  One 
position  is  that  the  resources  of  the  Fund  should  be  enhanced  to 
enable  it  to  deal  with  balance  of  payments  and  exchange  rate 
crises  of  developing  countries,  and  that  the  problem  of 
duplication  between  the  Fund  and  World  Bank  should  be  dealt  with 
by  more  precise  delineation  of  their  functions  and  improved 
coordination  between  the  two  institutions.  The  second  position, 
either  terminating  the  Fund  or  merging  its  functions  with  those 
of  the  World  Bank,  reflects  the  view  that  the  Fund  does  not 
provide  a unique  form  of  assistance  distinguishable  from  the 
development  assistance  provided  by  the  Bank. 
At  the  heart  of  the  debate  over  the  proposals  for  giving 
the  Fund  a role  in  establishing  a new  international  monetary 
system  is  the  controversy  over  whether  there  should  be  freely 
floating  exchange  rates  with  no  market  intervention  by  central 
banks,  or  a system  in which  governments  maintain  target  exchange 
rates  by  monetary  and  financial  measures,  including  market 
intervention.  Before  examining  the  specific  proposals,  I want  to 
review  the  arguments  for  and  against  freely  floating  exchange 
rates. 
Manased  Versus  Floatinq  Exchanqe  Rates 
Prior  to  World  War  I,  the  gold  standard  provided  a system  of 
fixed  exchange  rates  and  automatic  balance  of  payments  adjustment 7 
by  allowing  gold  movements  to  affect  the  money  supply.  The  gold 
standard  was  only  partially  restored  during  the  1920s.  In  the 
193os,  exchange  rates  were  neither  fixed  nor  freely  floating,  but 
were  managed  in  a way  that  resulted  in  restricted  and 
discriminatory  trade.  The  Bretton  Woods  system  of  fixed  but 
adjustable  parities  was  a compromise  between  the  gold  standard 
and  a managed  system.  Following  the  breakdown  of  the  Bretton 
Woods  par  value  system  in  the  early  197Os,  the  major  currencies 
were  allowed  to  float  with  occasional  attempts  to  manage  them, 
and  this  condition  exists  today.  While  there  is  general 
agreement  that  the  present  system  does  not  perform  well,  there  is 
strong  disagreement  on  whether  and  how  it  should  be  changed,  The 
ideal  system  is  one  in which  exchange  rates  among  the  major 
currencies  remain  fairly  stable  for  relatively  long  periods  of 
time,  changing  only  when  they  are  incompatible  with  balance  of 
payments  equilibrium.  An  equilibrium  exchange  rate  is  one  that 
can  be  maintained  without  substantial  intervention  in  the 
exchange  markets.  Equilibrium  does  not  require  a current  account 
balance.  A  country  with  a current  account  surplus  may  be  a net 
investor  abroad,  while  a country  with  a current  account  deficit 
may  be  a capital  importer.  A  freely  floating  rate  is  always  an 
equilibrium  rate,  but  the  country  may  have  a current  account 
balance  which  it  finds  undesirable,  or  the  exchange  value  of  its 
currency  may  fluctuate  widely. 
There  are  a  large  number  of  variables  in  the  complex  system 
of  simultaneous  equations  for  estimating  an  equilibrium  rate,  the 8 
most  important  of  which  are  the  macroeconomic  variables 
determined  by  the  economic  policies  of  the  country  itself  and  of 
the  countries  with  which  it  has  economic  relations.  An 
equilibrium  rate  may  not  be  compatible  with  a country's 
objectives  of  maintaining  full  employment,  price  stability,  and 
promoting  economic  growth.  Some  economists  have  defined  an 
equilibrium  rate  as  one  that  can  be  maintained  without 
intervention  and  is  consistent  with  internal  stability  and  a high 
level  of  employment.  Does  such  a rate  exist  under  all 
circumstances?  More  important,  is  there  a pattern  of  exchange 
rates  that  satisfies  the  equilibrium  conditions  for  each  of  the 
major  countries?  Those  who  propose  a multilateral  system  of 
exchange  rate  stabilization  assume  it  is  possible  to  maintain  a 
pattern  of  exchange  rates  that  is both  consistent  with  balance  of 
payments  equilibrium  and  with  the  economic  objectives  of  the 
countries  whose  currencies  are  stabilized.  There  are  certainly 
advantages  to  having  relatively  stable  exchange  rates,  especially 
for  the  currencies  of  the  leading  financial  powers.  The  current 
proposals  do  not  call  for  a return  to  the  par  value  system,  but 
rather  for  coordinated  central  bank  intervention  in  the  exchange 
markets  and  the  collaboration  of  governments  to  maintain  monetary 
and  fiscal  policies  that  promote  stability  for  an  agreed  pattern 
of  exchange  values.  At  the  time  of  the  Bretton  Woods  conference 
there  was  nearly  unanimous  agreement  on  the  desirability  of 
managed  exchange  rates:  however,  this  consensus  has  waned. 
Milton  Friedman  (1950)  has  argued  for  a half  century  that 9 
exchange  rates  should  be  determined  in  free  markets,  and  his 
position  is  echoed  by  many  leading  economists  today.  For 
example,  in  an  address  to  the  January  1995  Annual  Meeting  of  the 
American  Economic  Association,  George  P.  Schultz  (former 
Secretary  of  State  and  former  University  of  Chicago  Professor  of 
Economics),  stated  that  "We  should  stop  worrying  about  the 
exchange  system.  We  now  have  a dirty  float.  .  .the  system  would 
work  better  if  it were  cleaner,  that  is with  less  government 
intervention.  But  the  system  does  in  fact  work  reasonably  well 
and  has  done  so  over  a twenty-year  period  during  which  the  system 
has  experienced  and  absorbed  some  tumultuous  economic  changes" 
(Schultz,  1995,  p.  3). 
The  argument  for  freely  floating  exchange  rates  is  analogous 
to  that  for  free  markets  for  commodities,  services  and  capital. 
Price  stabilization  does  not  work  because  cyclical  movements 
cannot  be  accurately  projected  and  controlled  rates  are 
maintained  long  after  it  becomes  obvious  that  the  are  badly 
misaligned.  The  market  often  makes  mistakes,  but  it  soon 
corrects  them;  the  government  tries  to  cover  up  its  mistakes  and 
misallocation  of  resources  may  continue  for  a  long  period. 
Moderate  exchange  rate  fluctuations  in  free  markets  are  less 
harmful  than  the  drastic  changes  in  controlled  rates  that  must  be 
made  when  the  controlled  rate  is  recognized  as  highly  improper. 
Finally,  it  is  argued  that  free  fluctuating  rates  do  not 
significantly  increase  the  cost  of  trading  since  the  difference 
Milton  Friedman  (1950)  has  argued  for  a half  century-that  __ 10 
Those  favoring  managed  exchange  rates  argue  that  exchange 
rate  fluctuations  in  response  to  speculative  capital  movements 
and  other  temporary  forces  affecting  the  balance  of  payments 
result  in misaligned  rates  and  creates  a perpetual  state  of 
disequilibrium.  Even  if  the  government  makes  a mistake,  it  is 
better  to  establish  a target  rate  believed  to  be  consistent  with 
balance  of  payments  equilibrium  and  stand  ready  to  change  the 
target  whenever  it  is  shown  to  be  incorrect.  Allowing  exchange 
rates  to  float  freely  without  any  attempt  to  manage  them  is 
likely  to  mean  that  the  currency  will  be  continually  over-  or 
under-valued. 
In  appraising  the  positions  for  and  against  managed  rates, 
in  contrast  to  freely  floating  rates,  account  must  be  taken  of 
the  complex  relationships  between  the  trade  and  current  account 
balances  on  the  one  hand,  and  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  on  the 
other.  Trade  balances  are  much  more  sensitive  to  changes  in 
exchange  rates  than  the  services  and  investment  components  of  the 
current  account,  and  all  elements  of  the  current  account  are 
sensitive  to  changes  in business  conditions  at  home  and  abroad.  I 
begin  by  examining  the  effects  of  exchange  rate  changes  on  the 
trade  balance. 
A  change  in  the  exchange  rate  will  not  always  improve  the 
trade  balance,  or  it may  require  a year  or  more  before  it  does. 
This  is  true  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  prices  for  many 
internationally  traded  goods  do  not  immediately  adjust  to  changes 
in  exchange  rates.  If  the  U.S.  dollar  were  to  depreciate  by  10 11 
percent  in  terms  of  a composite  of  all  foreign  currencies,  the 
dollar  prices  of  imports  would  not  immediately  rise  by  10  percent 
because  some  foreign  suppliers  in  competition  with  domestic 
producers  would  not  raise  their  U.S.  prices  by  that  amount. 
Also,  some  U.S.  exporters  would  raise  their  dollar  prices  to 
maintain  the  foreign  currency  prices  of  their  exports.  Second, 
even  when  prices  are  adjusted  to  reflect  a change  in  the  exchange 
value  of  a currency,  consumers  are  often  sluggish  in  shifting 
purchases  from  foreign  to  domestic  sources.  Because  of  these  two 
factors,  the  immediate  effect  of  a currency  depreciation  may  be 
to  worsen  the  trade  balance  for  a few  months,  following  which 
improvement  may  take  place  gradually  over  a couple  of  years. 
This  is  sometimes  called  the  J-curve  effect,  which  indicates  an 
initial  worsening  of  the  trade  balance  after  depreciation 
(Krugman,  1991,  Ch.  2). 
A  third  reason  why  changing  the  exchange  rate  may  not 
improve  the  trade  balance  relates  to  the  macroeconomic 
conditions.  If  a country's  current  account  balance  is  to 
improve,  there  must  be  an  increase  in  that  country's  total  output 
relative  to  its  total  expenditures  on  consumption  and  investment. 
The  current  account  balance  (B) must  always  equal  the  difference 
between  national  output  (0)  and  total  expenditures.  This 
identity  may  be  expressed  as 
B=O-C-I-G 
where  C  is  private  consumption,  I is  private  domestic  investment, 
and  G  is government  spending.  Thus,  to  improve  the  current 12 
account  balance,  currency  depreciation  must  be  accompanied  by  an 
increase  in  0,  or  a decrease  in  C+I  or  G.  Currency  depreciation 
will  not  automatically  induce  the  macroeconomic  conditions  for 
improving  B.  While  depreciation  may  stimulate  0,  it may  also 
stimulate  consumption,  investment,  and  government  spending. 
Under  these  conditions,  currency  depreciation  may  fail  to  improve 
the  current  account  balance  and  its  most  important  component,  the 
trade  balance.  To  cite  an  example  of  the  failure  of  a nominal 
exchange  rate  depreciation  to  bring  about  an  improvement  in  the 
trade  balance,  the  U.S.  trade  deficit  rose  from  $74  billion  in 
1991  to  $133  billion  in  1993,  and  was  about  $120  billion  in  1994. 
This  occurred  despite  a more  than  40  percent  decline  in  the  value 
of  the  dollar  in terms  of  yen  between  1990  and  the  end  of  1994, 
and  a somewhat  smaller  depreciation  of  the  dollar  in  terms  of  the 
DM. 
To  be  effective  in  improving  the  trade  balance,  there  must 
be  a decrease  in  the  real  value  of  the  currency  in  contrast  to  a 
change  in  the  nominal  value.  Following  a nominal  depreciation 
there  may  be  an  inflationary  rise  in  domestic  prices,  which  will 
prevent  the  prices  of  internationally  tradeable  goods  from  rising 
relative  to  nontradeables  (e.g.,  construction  and  services)  so 
that  there  is no  decline  in  the  real  exchange  rate  (RER).  One 
way  of  measuring  changes  in the  RER  is  to  multiply  the  nominal 
exchange  rate  by  the  ratio  of  the  foreign  price  index  to  the 
domestic  price  index.  Another  definition  of  RER  is  the  ratio  of 
the  price  index  of  tradeable  goods  to  the  price  index  of 13 
nontradeable  goods.  If  this  index  rises,  the  production  of 
tradeable  goods  for  export  and  for  competition  with  imports  will 
increase  relative  to  the  production  of  nontradeable  goods 
(Edwards  1986).  When  exchange  rate  depreciation  is  accompanied 
by  inflation,  foreign  competition  in  tradeables  will  tend  to  keep 
domestic  tradeable  prices  low  relative  to  prices  of 
nontradeables,  so  that  the  trade  balance  will  not  improve. 
What  exchange  rate  policy  should  be  followed  in  dealing  with 
external  shocks  such  as  a sudden  surge  in  export  income  following 
a  substantial  increase  in world  prices  of  a major  export,  or  a 
sudden  rise  in  the  price  of  a major  import,  such  as  petroleum?  A 
sudden  increase  in  export  income  exposes  a country  to  the  "Dutch 
disease"  (Corden  & Neary,  1982).  Under  floating  rates,  the 
appreciation  of  a currency  increases  prices  for  nontradeable 
commodities  relative  to  those  of  tradeable  commodities,  thereby 
putting  tradeables  at  a disadvantage  in  competing  in world 
markets.  One  way  to  avoid  this  is  to  prevent  the  appreciation  of 
the  currency  through  market  intervention.  In  the  case  of  a 
sudden  doubling  of  petroleum  prices,  such  as  occurred  in  the 
197os,  under  a  freely  floating  rate  system  foreign  exchange 
expenditures  by  fuel-dependent  countries  could  increase  by  20 
percent  or  more,  causing  a very  large  depreciation  in  their 
currencies.  Those  favoring  managed  exchange  rates  would  argue 
that  a  sharp  rate  change  should  be  avoided  or  at  least  moderated, 
especially  since  there  would  be  no  immediate  improvement  in 
export  income  from  the  depreciation. 14 
The  relationship  between  a country's  exchange  rate  and  its 
current  account  has  important  implications  for  both  the  freely 
floating  and  managed  rate  arguments.  A  floating  rate  will  not 
automatically  correct  a current  account  deficit  or  improve  a 
trade  balance.  A  freely  floating  rate  will  assure  equality  of 
total  payments  and  total  receipts,  but  the  equilibrium  rate  may 
not  necessarily  be  the  appropriate  rate  for  reducing  the  current 
account  balance.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  exceedingly  difficult 
to  select  a managed  rate  that  will  both  improve  the  current 
account  and  at  the  same  time  be  an  equilibrium  rate.  Is  it 
better  to  have  an  equilibrium  rate  at  all  times  that  may  be 
incompatible  for  a time  with  the  desired  trade  and  current 
account  balances,  or  have  a managed  rate  which  very  likely  will 
be  incompatible  with  equilibrium? 
Capital  movements  present  special  problems  for  exchange  rate 
policy.  They  take  place  in  response  to  interest  rate 
differentials:  to  changes  in  business  conditions  which  affect 
investments  by  multilateral  firms  in  foreign  markets:  and  to 
perceived  risk  or  opportunities  for  speculative  gains.  Under  a 
floating  rate  system,  the  capital  movements  cause  immediate 
changes  in  exchange  rates  and  only  over  time  will  they  induce 
adjustments  in the  trade  and  current  account  balances.  Those 
favoring  manaqed  exchange  rates  argue  that  target  rates  should  be 
maintained  in  the  face  of  sharp  capital  exports  or  imports,  and 
changed  only  in response  to  longer  term  irreversible  movements. 
An  immediate  depreciation  or  appreciation  of  a currency  caused  by 15 
speculative  capital  movements  may  encourage  larger  movements 
without  affecting  the  trade  balance.  A  continuing  net  inflow  or 
outflow  of  investment  capital  must  be  accompanied  by  a change  in 
the  current  account,  and  such  a change  may  require  altering  the 
target  exchange  rate:  but  the  appropriate  rate  can  only  be 
determined  over  time. 
Those  favoring  a  free  exchange  market  argue  that  maintaining 
an  exchange  rate  in  the  face  of  capital  flight  results  in  a  loss 
of  monetary  reserves,  which  itself  undermines  confidence  and 
causes  further  capital  flight.  Moreover,  the  failure  of  a 
country's  exchange  rate  to  depreciate  with  adverse  financial 
developments  may  lead  to  a massive  capital  flight  induced  by  the 
expectation  of  a  larger  currency  depreciation.  As  regards  long- 
term  capital  movements,  supporters  of  freely  floating  rates  argue 
that  the  market  is  a better  judge  of  the  appropriate  level. for 
the  exchange  rate.  Gradual  movements  will  do  less  harm  to  a 
country's  investment  climate  than  large  sudden  changes.  While 
the  market  may  overshoot  the  appropriate  exchange  rate,  market 
uncertainty  with  respect  to  an  anticipated  change  in  the  target 
rate  may  encourage  disequilibrating  capital  movements. 
The  above  conflicting  arguments  provide  little  basis  for 
confident  conclusions  and  much  more  experience  with  managed  rates 
under  a variety  of  conditions  is  required.  The  argument  for 
managed  rates  is  usually  based  on  the  assumption  that  central 
banks  and  finance  ministers  have  considerable  ability  in 
projecting  the  future,  and  taking  full  account  of  all  the 16 
variables  in  setting  target  rates.  Doubts  as  to  their  ability 
to  identify  equilibrium  exchange  rates,  or  even  to  know  the 
direction  in which  they  ought  to  move,  have  been  expressed  by 
Paul  Krugman  (1990,  Ch.  14)  in  the  following  statement: 
llUnfortunately,  we  still  do  not  know  enough  to  give  clear  and 
simple  advice  in  all  circumstances  to  central  bankers  and  finance 
ministers.  In  particular,  the  current  situation  in which  an 
intelligent  appreciation  of  what  we  know  about  equilibrium 
exchange  rates  leads  to  a definite  'don't  know'  response  to 
questions  about  where  to  go  from  here."  Supporters  of  free 
floating  would  respond  by  saying  that  if the  central  bankers 
"don't  know,"  the  market  will  always  provide  the  best  answer. 
Instruments  for  Manasina  Exchanae  Rates 
The  principal  instruments  for  managing  exchange  rates  are 
(1)  central  bank  intervention  in the  exchange  market,  (2) 
changing  short-term  interest  rates,  and  (3)  fiscal  policy.  The 
first  two  are  usually  under  the  control  of  central  banks,  while 
fiscal  policy,  which  is  controlled  by  both  the  government 
administration  and  the  legislature,  is  rarely  used  by  governments 
of  major  countries  to  manage  exchange  rates.  Central  bank 
intervention  is  of  two  types:  sterilized  and  unsterilized.  In 
the  case  of  unsterilized  intervention,  purchasing  a  foreign 
currency  on  the  exchange  markets  with  domestic  currency,  or 
purchasing  the  domestic  currency  with  foreign  exchange,  are 
allowed  to  have  their  full  impact  on  the  country's  bank  reserves 
and,  therefore,  on  interest  rates  and  the  quantity  of  money. 17 
Most  intervention  is  sterilized  and  its  record  of  success  in 
keeping  exchange  rates  within  an  agreed  range  is  poor  (Humpage 
(1993,  pp.  2-16;  Obstfeld,  1990,  Ch.  5).  A  recent  review  of  the 
literature  on  central  bank  intervention  (Edison,  1993,  p.  55) 
concludes  that  "The  empirical  evidence,  although  allowing  for  the 
possibility  of  short-lived  effects,  does  not  ascribe  to 
intervention  a long-lasting  effect  on  the  foreign  exchange 
markets." 
While  intervention  serves  to  signal  to  the  market  the 
official  view  of  the  government  on  exchange  rate  policy,  the 
volume  of  intervention  tends  to  be  too  small  in  relation  to  total 
market  forces  to  substantially  affect  the  rate.  An  example  is 
provided  by  the  action  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  (FED),  in 
collaboration  with  a number  of  European  central  banks,  to  support 
the  dollar  in  early  March  1995.  At  this  time,  the  FED  purchased 
$450  million  against  the  German  mark  and  $370  million  against  the 
Japanese  yen.  According  to  a report  published  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  (1995),  "The  dollar  met  aggressive 
selling  by  market  participants  and  proceeded  to  trade 
progressively  lower.  .  .  .‘I  During  the  period  January-March  1995 
when  the  dollar  was  under  substantial  pressure,  U.S.  monetary 
authorities  intervened  in  the  amount  of  $1.42  billion  against  the 
yen  and  the  DM.  Nevertheless,  the  exchange  value  of  the  dollar 
continued  to  decline  in terms  of  these  currencies.  Small 
interventions  cannot  be  very  effective  in  a world  currency  market 
with  daily  transactions  currently  exceeding  a trillion  dollars. 18 
A  truly  massive  intervention  would  almost  certainly  stabilize  the 
dollar  for  a time,  but  this  could  prove  very  costly  if  the 
stabilized  rate  proved  to  be  untenable. 
Short-term  interest  rates  are  sometimes  altered  by  central 
banks  in  order  to  support  the  exchange  value  of  a currency.  The 
German  Bundesbank  cut  its  discount  rate  from  4.5  percent  to  4.0 
percent  on  March  30,  1995  to  support  the  dollar  (Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  New  York  (1995,  p.  9).  A  similar  reduction  taken  at  the 
same  time  by  the  Bank  of  Japan  was  probably  for  the  same  reason. 
So  far  as  I have  been  able  to  discover,  there  was  only  one 
occasion  when  the  FED  deliberately  increased  domestic  interest 
rates  in  response  to  a desire  to  bolster  the  foreign  exchange 
value  of  the  dollar.  In  early  November  1987  the  FED  and  the 
Treasury  launched  a massive  program  to  reverse  the  sharp  decline 
in  the  dollar  by  a combination  of  foreign  exchange  intervention 
and  credit  restraint.  The  discount  rate  at  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  New  York  was  increased  from  8.5  percent  to  9.5  percent 
and  a supplementary  reserve  requirement  equal  to  2 percent  of 
time  deposits  was  established  for  commercial  bank  members  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System.  At  the  same  time,  both  the  FED  and  the 
Treasury  mobilized  foreign  exchange  from  various  sources  for  sale 
in  the  exchange  markets  to  raise  the  value  of  the  dollar  (Wall 
Street  Journal,  1978,  p.  19).  Although  there  was  no  intention  to 
peg  the  exchange  rate  for  the  dollar  at  any  specific  level,  the 
dollar  did  rise  7.5  percent  against  the  Swiss  franc,  7 percent 
against  the  DM,  and  5 percent  against  the  yen.  It  should  be 19 
observed,  however,  that  this  action  was  not  necessarily  at 
variance  with  President  Carter's  anti-inflation  program  underway 
at  the  time.  There  is  little  indication  that  recent  FED  interest 
rate  policy  has  been  motivated  by  a desire  to  support  the  dollar. 
International  Monetarv  Policv  Coordination 
Efforts  to  manage  exchange  rates  are  likely  to  be  more 
successful  when  a group  of  countries  coordinate  their  policies 
than  if  each  country  acts  alone.  Assuming  the  major  economic 
powers  were  to  reach  an  agreement  on  a set  of  target  exchange 
rates,  they  could  coordinate  their  monetary  and  fiscal  policies 
and  central  bank  intervention  operations  in  an  effort  to 
stabilize  the  rates  or  to  maintain  them  within  a specified  range. 
Countries  with  strong  currencies  could  reduce  their  short-term 
interest  rates  and  budget  surpluses,  while  countries  with  weak 
currencies  could  increase  their  interest  rates  and  eliminate 
budget  deficits.  However,  these  measures  may  well  conflict  with 
the  domestic  objectives  of  those  countries  agreeing  to 
coordination. 
A  convergence  of  governmental  policies  directed  toward 
stabilizing  exchange  rates  is  sometimes  advocated.  This  could 
mean  adopting  the  same  objectives,  such  as  full  employment  and 
price  stability,  with  the  expectation  that  governments  would  be 
using  similar  monetary  and  fiscal  measures  for  achieving  these 
objectives.  Convergence  appears  to  be  the  goal  of  the  Maastricht 
Treaty  signed  by  members  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  in  February 
1992.  Convergence  is  defined  as  achieving  common  economic 20 
integration  objectives,  such  as  price  stability,  budgetary 
discipline,  and  maintaining  exchange  rates  within  a narrow  band 
(L.  Bini-Smaghi  et  al.,  1994).  The  convergence  criteria  in  the 
Treaty  provide  that  as  a condition  for  joining  the  European 
Monetary  Union  (EMU),  a country's  inflation  rate  cannot  exceed 
the  inflation  rates  of  the  countries  with  the  three  lowest  rates 
by  more  than  1.5  percentage  points;  fiscal  deficits  can  be  no 
more  than  3 percent  of  GDP;  and  the  nominal  long-term  interest 
rates  cannot  exceed  by  more  than  2 percentage  points  the  rates  in 
the  best  performing  countries  in  terms  of  price  stability.  A 
question  arises  as  to  whether  the  convergence  criteria  for 
membership  in  the  EMU  will  guarantee  exchange  rate  stability, 
since  each  country  will  be  employing  different  policies  within 
the  limits  established  by  the  criteria.  Countries  experiencing  a 
recession  would  be  inclined  to  lower  interest  rates  and  maintain 
the  highest  permitted  fiscal  deficit,  while  countries  with  low 
unemployment  and  relatively  high  inflation  would  tend  to  raise 
their  interest  rates  and  cut  their  deficits.  A  coordinated 
effort  to  stabilize  a set  of  exchange  rates  would  call  for  the 
adoption  of  policies  aimed  specifically  at  stabilizing  the  target 
rates.  For  example,  if  the  franc  were  weak,  an  increase  in  the 
French  interest  rate  would  strengthen  the  franc.  But  if  the 
French  economy  was  in  recession,  a rise  in  the  interest  rate 
would  be  antithetical  to  French  recovery.  Each  of  the  G-7 
members  might  agree  to  pursue  the  same  objectives  of  price 
stability,  low  unemployment  and  fiscal  balance,  but  if  some 21 
countries  had  low  unemployment  and  rapidly  rising  prices  while 
others  were  in  a state  of  recession,  the  policies  each  would 
follow  might  be  just  the  opposite  of  those  required  for 
maintaining  an  agreed  pattern  of  exchange  rates. 
Proposals  for  an  Active  Role  by  the  IMF 
in  the  International  Monetarv  Svstem 
The  most  frequently  discussed  proposals  for  an  active  role 
by  the  IMF  in  reforming  the  international  monetary  system  are  (1) 
those  proposed  by  the  Bretton  Woods  Commission,  and  (2)  the 
target  zone  system  put  forward  by  economists  associated  with  the 
Institute  for  International  Economics  (Williamson  & Miller,  1987; 
Williamson  61  Henning,  1994;  Bergsten  & Williamson,  1994).  The 
Bretton  Woods  Commission  report  (1994b,  pp.  A-4-5)  made  a three- 
part  proposal  for  international  monetary  reform:  (1)  "The  major 
industrial  countries  should  strengthen  their  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies  and  achieve  greater  overall  macroeconomic  convergence; 
(2) these  countries  should  establish  a more  formal  system  of 
coordination,  involving  firm  and  credible  commitments,  to  support 
these  policy  improvements  and  avoid  excessive  exchange  rate 
misalignments  and  volatility;  and  (3)  the  IMF  should  be  given  a 
central  role  in  coordinating  macroeconomic  policies  and  in 
developing  and  implementing  monetary  reform.1V  The  Report 
suggests  that  the  G-7  should  grant  operating  authority  for 
stabilizing  exchange  rates  to  the  IMF.  However,  the  Report  is 
vague  regarding  the  nature  and  implementation  of  the  new 
international  monetary  system.  It merely  recommends  that  the 
system  should  promote  exchange  rate  stability  and  avoid 22 
misaligned  rates.  Without  formally  endorsing  the  target  zone 
system,  the  Report  appears  to  favor  some  flexibility  of  exchange 
rates  rather  than  fixing  rates  at  particular  levels.  The  G-7 
would  need  to  negotiate  agreements  among  its  members  regarding 
their  obligations  for  promoting  exchange  rate  stability,  but  how 
such  an  agreement  would  be  reached  on  the  pattern  of  rates  to  be 
stabilized  is  not  revealed.  Presumably,  an  important  function  of 
the  IMF  would  be  to  prepare  a detailed  plan  of  an  agreement  to  be 
approved  by  the  G-7. 
The  Tarset  Zone  Svstem 
According  to  the  Williamson  and  Henning  blueprint  for  a 
target  zone  system,  rates  would  be  maintained  within  a  zone  of 
fluctuation,  to  be  based  on  fundamental  equilibrium  exchange 
rates  (FEER).  The  FEER  would  be  consistent  with  the  current 
account  balance  of  each  country  and  with  its  domestic  objectives 
of  full  employment  and  price  stability.  The  G-7  finance 
ministers  and  central  bank  managers  would  be  'Iat  the  center  of 
international  monetary  management."  The  IMF  would  provide  both 
the  secretariat  and  the  forum  within  which  the  G-7  ministers 
would  make  basic  policy  decisions.  The  G-7  would  set  targets  for 
the  current  account  balances  of  the  participants  in  the  target 
zone  regime:  identify  the  FEERs;  and  establish  procedures  for 
realigning  target  zones  in  response  to  developments  calling  for 
balance  of  payments  adjustments  (Williamson  & Henning,  1994,  p. 
104).  The  Fund  would  have  the  power  of  surveillance  over  the 
exchange  policies  of  its  members.  However,  a council  of  G-7 23 
finance  ministers  would  establish  the  target  zones  for  the 
exchange  rates,  and  determine  the  changes  in monetary  and  fiscal 
policies  needed  to  sustain  them. 
Supporters  of  the  target  zone  system  apparently  assume  that 
the  band  within  which  exchange  rates  fluctuate  will  be  wide 
enough  to  accommodate  pressures  arising  from  speculative  capital 
movements,  and  that  the  capital  movements  will  tend  to  reverse 
when  the  exchange  rate  on  either  end  of  the  target  zone  is 
approached.  One  problem  this  poses  is the  width  of  the  band.  If 
it  is very  wide,  say,  20  percent,  the  target  zone  would 
contribute  little  to  reducing  exchange  rate  fluctuations. 
Conversely,  the  narrower  the  band  the  more  difficult  it would  be 
to  maintain  the  rates  within  the  zone.  There  is  also  the 
question  of  how  frequently  and  under  what  conditions  the  band 
would  be  changed.  If  the  band  is  not  changed  quickly  after  the 
market  perceives  that  fundamental  conditions  are  inconsistent 
with  maintaining  rates  within  the  band,  there  would  be  large 
capital  movements  requiring  very  large  offsetting  interventions. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  band  is  changed  frequently,  the  system 
will  lose  credibility  and  there  will  be  little  exchange  rate 
stability  (Kenen,  1994). 
Onnosition  to  a Role  for  the  Fund 
Opposition  to  a substantial  role  for  the  Fund  in  a new 
international  monetary  system  has  been  expressed  by  both 
academic  economists  and  government  officials.  Most  opposition 
concerns  the  desirability  or  feasibility  of  managing  exchange 24 
rates,  either  unilaterally  or  multilaterally.  One  objection  is 
that  exchange  rate  management  is  likely  to  be  more  harmful  than 
beneficial  because  governments  will  tend  to  support  improper 
exchange  rates  long  after  fundamental  conditions  change.  (This 
is  clearly  the  position  of  Milton  Friedman  and  George  Schultz.) 
A  second  objection  is  that  the  cost  of  currency  stabilization 
arising  from  the  loss  of  freedom  to  use  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies  for  promoting  domestic  objectives  outweighs  any  possible 
benefits.  Some  doubt  that  currency  fluctuations  significantly 
impede  trade  since  the  cost  of  hedging  contracts  in  foreign 
currencies  is  relatively  small.  A  third  objection  is that 
neither  the  Fund  nor  the  G-7  will  be  able  to  determine  FEERs 
accurately,  or  to  recognize  when  conditions  dictate  a change  in 
FEERs.  A  fourth  objection  is  that  central  bank  intervention 
cannot  maintain  exchange  rates  in  the  face  of  large  speculative 
capital  movements.  Finally,  many  doubt  it will  be  possible  for 
the  major  countries  to  reach  agreement  on  the  pattern  of  exchange 
rates  they  would  support,  either  because  the  rates  may  not  be 
consistent  with  their  trade  objectives  or  because  the  monetary 
and  fiscal  policies  required  to  support  the  rates  are 
inconsistent  with  domestic  economic  objectives. 
Representatives  from  the  governments  of  major  countries  who 
attended  the  1994  Bretton  Woods  conference  in  Washington  were  not 
enthusiastic  about  either  multilateral  coordination  or  a dominant 
role  for  the  IMF  in  creating  a new  international  monetary  system. 
Larry  Summers,  currently  U.S.  Deputy  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 25 
expressed  doubts  regarding  the  feasibility  of  policy  convergence 
in  the  light  of  the  EU  experience  (Bretton  Woods  Commission, 
1994a,  p.  19).  The  Japanese  Vice  Minister  of  Finance  for 
International  Affairs,  Kosuke  Nakahira,  also  played  down  a  future 
role  for  the  Fund,  stating  that  "What  is  important,  in my  view, 
is  to  have  frequent  and  informal  contacts  among  policy  makers, 
Ministers  of  Finance,  and  Central  Bank  Governors  or  their 
Deputies,  say,  through  G-7  meetings  or  other  appropriate  forums 
rather  than  to  formalize  or  institutionalize  the  coordination 
process"  (Bretton  Woods  Commission,  1994a,  p.  23).  The 
representative  of  the  German  Federal  Ministry  of  Finance,  Gert 
Haller,  rejected  international  coordination  of  monetary  and 
fiscal  policies  and  target  zones  on  both  theoretical  and  policy 
grounds  (Bretton  Woods  Commission,  1994a,  p.  21). 
Since  the  termination  of  the  gold  convertibility  of  the 
dollar  in  1971,  the  U.S.  government  has  had  relatively  little 
interest  in  stabilizing  the  foreign  exchange  value  of  the  dollar, 
showing  concern  only  when  the  dollar  depreciated  sharply.  During 
the  first  Reagan  Administration,  the  Treasury  Department  was 
against  intervention  in  the  exchange  market  and  any  other  action 
to  reduce  the  value  of  the  dollar,  which  in  1984  was  generally 
regarded  as  substantially  overvalued.  When  James  Baker  became 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in January  1985,  there  was  a shift  in 
the  Treasury's  position  on  the  dollar.  At  the  Plaza  Agreement 
meeting  in  September  1985,  the  U.S.  Treasury,  in  cooperation  with 
other  G-7  governments,  agreed  to  reduce  the  external  value  of  the 26 
dollar  by  intervention,  and  the  dollar  depreciated  during  1985- 
1987.  At  the  G-7  Louvre  Summit  in  February  1987,  an  agreement 
was  reached  on  collective  action  to  stop  the  decline  of  the 
dollar  and  stabilize  G-7  currencies  within  reference  ranges. 
There  was,  however,  little  willingness  on  the  part  of  governments 
to  change  their  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  After  rallying  in 
1988,  the  dollar  resumed  its  decline  in  1989  and  continued  to 
fall  during  the  first  half  of  the  1990s.  At  recent  G-7  meetings, 
the  communiques  pay  lip  service  to  cooperation,  but  formal 
arrangements  are  not  supported. 
Economists  Views  on  the  Role  of  the  Fund 
Aside  from  those  associated  with  the  Institute  for 
International  Economics  and  with  the  IMF,  economists  specializing 
in  international  finance  have  not  been  enthusiastic  about  either 
a new  international  monetary  system  for  stabilizing  exchange 
rates  or  a major  role  for  the  IMF.  They  find  a  likely  conflict 
between  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  that  will  maintain  a set  of 
target  rates  or  zones  within  which  rates  may  move  on  the  one 
hand,  and  policies  designed  to  achieve  domestic  objectives.  This 
is  particularly  the  case  for  G-7  countries  that  have  no 
commitment  to  a common  currency,  but  this  conflict  is  also 
impeding  realization  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  for  achieving  an 
EMU  by  1999  (Kenen,  1994).  Richard  Cooper  (1994)  finds  the 
Williamson  et  al.  target  zone  proposal  unacceptable  for  two  major 
reasons.  First,  it would  require  an  agreement  on  national 
current  account  targets  among  the  G-7  countries,  which  he  does 27 
not  to  be  possible.  He  does  not  believe  the  IMF  or  any  other 
body  can  be  given  the  authority  to  determine  what  Japan's  surplus 
should  be  or  how  much  of  a deficit  the  U.S.  should  accept  in 
accommodating  a Japanese  surplus.  A  second  difficulty  is  that  no 
outside  body  could  decide  whether  the  U.S.  government  should  have 
a balanced  fiscal  budget,  especially  since  agreement  on  a 
balanced  budget  amendment  has  not  been  reached  within  the  U.S. 
government.  Cooper  also  raises  the  question  of  whether  there 
would  be  an  adjustment  in  current  account  targets  following 
global  shocks,  and  what  would  be  the  adjustment  in  FEERs 
following  such  shocks.  A  sharp  rise  in  oil  prices  would  improve 
Britain's  current  account  and  adversely  affect  the  current 
accounts  of  the  U.S.  and  Japan.  Britain  would  undoubtedly  oppose 
an  appreciation  of  the  pound  following  an  increase  in  oil  prices 
since  it would  be  to  the  disadvantage  of  her  manufacturing 
industries. 
Barry  Eichengreen  (1995)  contends  that  there  is  no  middle 
ground  between  freely  floating  rates  and  a unified  monetary 
system  with  a common  currency,  such  as  the  EU  is  seeking  to 
achieve.  In  his  view,  stabilizing  exchange  rates  through  policy 
coordination  or  convergence  is  not  possible.  Monetary 
unification  requires  a high  degree  of  political  integration, 
which  seems  very  far  in  the  future  even  for  the  EU  countries. 
Richard  Cooper  takes  much  the  same  position  as  Eichengreen 
criticism  of  the  target  zone  system.  He  suggests  that  "in 
long  run,  but  not  for  the  next  few  years,  we  will  desire 
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irrevocably  fixed  exchange  rates  among  the  major  currencies--in 
effect,  a common  currency  among  the  industrialized  democracies" 
(Cooper,  1994,  p.  116).  Thus,  we  find  a  fundamental  conflict  in 
the  positions  taken  by  leading  international  economists  on  the 
possibility  of  forming  an  international  monetary  system  in which 
there  is multinational  coordination  to  stabilize  exchange  rates. 
Without  a specific  commitment  by  governments  to  support  an 
exchange  rate  stabilization  program  in which  the  Fund  would  play 
a major  role,  the  Fund  is  left  with  its  present  international 
monetary  role  of  preparing  financial  analyses,  carrying  on 
11formal11  annual  consultations  with  individual  members,  and 
admonishing  the  finance  ministers  of  leading  countries  to  take 
measures  these  ministers  usually  find  incompatible  with  domestic 
objectives.  These  functions  do  not  constitute  a significant  role 
for  the  Fund  in the  international  monetary  system. 
One  IMF  function  that  should  be  retained  in  some  way  is 
enforcement  of  the  rules  on  exchange  restrictions  on  current 
transactions  and  on  the  use  of  multiple  exchange  rates  set  forth 
in  the  Articles  of  Agreement.  These  rules  have  their  counterpart 
in  GATT  rules  on  trade  restrictions  and  on  import  subsidies  and 
countervailing  duties.  Exchange  restrictions  can  be  used  to 
accomplish  the  same  purposes  as  trade  restrictions,  and  the  two 
sets  of  rules  should  be  made  consonant  and  enforced.  If the  Fund 
were  to  be  abolished  or  merged  with  the  Bank,  one  way  to  preserve 
this  function  would  be  to  transfer  responsibility  to  the  WTO  for 
enforcing  the  rules  on  exchange  restrictions  and  multiple  exchange  rates. 29 
IMF  Assistance  to  Developing  Countries 
The  traditional  purpose  of  the  Fund's  financial  assistance 
has  been  to  help  countries  restore  balance  of  payments 
equilibrium  without  resorting  to  trade  or  exchange  restrictions 
on  imports,  defaulting  on  international  debt,  or  reducing 
investments  important  for  economic  growth.  Normally,  member 
countries  are  permitted  to  draw  foreign  exchange  from  the  Fund  up 
to  the  limit  determined  by  the  member's  quota.  Repayment  terms 
are  not  fixed,  as  in  the  case  of  a  loan,  but  repayments  are 
expected  to  begin  after  three  years  out  of  a payments  surplus 
generated  by  either  an  improvement  in  external  market  conditions 
or  by  policies  designed  to  improve  the  balance  of  payments. 
Assistance  from  the  Fund  has  never  been  an  unqualified  right, 
since  the  Fund  has  the  authority  to  declare  a member  ineligible 
to  draw  foreign  exchange  if  it  finds  the  member's  policies 
inconsistent  with  restoring  equilibrium.  However,  in  order  to 
assure  members  that  they  can  obtain  assistance  from  the  Fund 
during  a certain  period,  the  Fund  adopted  the  practice  of 
negotiating  "standby  agreements,"  according  to  which  the  Fund  is 
obligated  to  provide  a certain  amount  of  assistance  over  a 
period,  say,  six  months  or  a year,  while  the  member  agrees  to 
follow  specific  exchange,  credit  and  fiscal  policies  during  that 
period.  Failure  of  the  country  to  follow  these  policies  may 
result  in  a refusal  by  the  Fund  to  negotiate  a new  standby 
arrangement. 
The  sources  of  balance  of  payments  disequilibria  for  which 30 
the  Fund  has  normally  provided  assistance  include  short-falls  in 
export  earnings  resulting  from  supply  shortages  or  sharp 
decreases  in  prices  of  export  commodities:  emergencies  such  as 
natural  disasters;  and  improper  monetary  and  fiscal  policies. 
While  the  Fund  continues  to  provide  assistance  in  response  to 
problems  arising  from  the  above  sources,  it  found  that  many  of 
its  members  have  structural  problems  that  keep  them  in  a 
condition  of  perpetual  disequilibrium  and  low  growth,  in  contrast 
to  temporary  conditions  that  are  cyclical  or  can  be  dealt  with  by 
monetary  and  fiscal  restraint.  Over  the  past  decade,  the  Fund 
has  introduced  new  loan  facilities  that  differ  from  traditional 
assistance  provided  in  response  to  balance  of  payments 
disequilibria.  One  is  the  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  (SAF), 
which  provides  loans  on  very  liberal  terms--an  interest  rate  of 
only  0.5  percent  and  repayments  over  five-and-one-half  to  ten 
years --in  support  of  macroeconomic  reforms  and  structural 
adjustments.  SAF  loans  are  accompanied  by  detailed  agreements  on 
programs  that  may  deal  with  the  curtailment  of  bank  credits, 
privatization  of  state  enterprises,  or  the  elimination  of  price 
controls  and  trade  restrictions.  Periodic  releases  of  the 
credits  depend  on  the  borrower's  performance  under  the  agreement. 
Not  all  of  the  SAFs  have  succeeded  in  achieving  balance  of 
payments  improvement  and  satisfactory  economic  growth.  There 
have  been  several  outright  failures,  especially  in  the  African 
countries  of  Zambia  and  Zaire.  In  some  of  these  countries 
economic  progress  has  been  impaired  by  civil  war  and 31 
irresponsible  dictators.  As  of  FY  1994,  Fund  obligations  in 
arrears  totaled  2.9  billion  SDRs  ($4.3  billion).  Many  countries 
would  probably  default  on  their  repurchase  obligations  to  the 
Fund  if  they  could  not  continue  to  receive  new  loans.  Hence, 
repayments  are  not  being  made  from  improvements  in the  balance  of 
payments.  To  quote  Peter  Kenen  (1994,  p.  34),  "It  is  time  to 
concede  that  the  Fund  and  the  Bank  have  been  involved  in  the 
facto  rescheduling  of  their  claims  on  a number  of  developing 
countries  that  cannot  possibly  repay  them."  Assistance  from 
Fund  has  undoubtedly  helped  some  countries  liberalize  their 
economies  and  achieve  reasonable  growth  rates.  On  the  other 
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hand,  it  is  argued  that  the  absence  of  financial  assistance  from 
the  Fund  might  force  countries  to  institute  economic  reforms  more 
rapidly  and  avoid  accumulating  external  indebtedness. 
Another  facility,  called  the  "systemic  transformation 
facility,"  was  created  by  the  Fund  in  1993  to  assist  former 
Soviet  countries  in  the  process  of  transforming  to  private 
enterprise  and  free  markets.  Such  assistance  involves  problems 
quite  different  from  those  dealt  with  in  developing  countries, 
most  of  which  have  largely  private  economies  with  markets,  credit 
institutions,  and  reasonably  functioning  systems  of  monetary  and 
fiscal  control.  The  Fund's  staff  has  formulated  national  plans 
for  new  financial  institutions  in the  former  Soviet  countries  to 
mobilize  and  allocate  credit,  and  for  creating  capital  markets 
required  for  transferring  ownership  from  the  state  to  the  private 
sector.  The  Fund's  functions  in  these  countries  are  not  only  far 32 
removed  from  those  for  which  it was  designed,  but  there  is  little 
to  distinguish  them  from  the  functions  of  the  World  Bank 
operating  in the  same  countries. 
The  Fund's  programs  in  Russia  and  several  other  former 
Soviet  countries  have  not  been  very  successful  in  either 
promoting  the  transition  to  capitalism  or  improving  the  balance 
of  payments.  Privatization  has  been  slow  and  trade  has  fallen 
sharply,  partly  as  a result  of  the  collapse  of  ruble-based  trade 
and  the  shortage  of  foreign  exchange  for  financing  trade  with 
convertible  currencies  (Black,  1994,  pp.  265-272).  In  June  1993, 
Russia  obtained  from  the  Fund  a  loan  of  1.1  billion  SDRs  ($1.6 
billion),  but  the  government  was  prevented  from  drawing  more  than 
the  first  25 percent,  because  of  its  inability  to  achieve  the 
required  degree  of  monetary  and  fiscal  control.  Strong  political 
pressure  has  been  put  on  the  Fund  to  release  the  loan  funds. 
Chaotic  political  and  social  conditions  are  perhaps  the  major 
barriers  to  economic  reconstruction  and  internal  stability  in 
Russia.  Should  the  Fund  attempt  to  operate  in  such  an 
environment? 
Whv  Two  Development  Institutions? 
Just  as  the  Fund  discovered  that  countries  with  chronic 
balance  of  payments  deficits  could  not  improve  their  payments 
position  without  structural  changes  in  institutions,  markets  and 
government  operations,  so  also  the  World  Bank  found  that  many  of 
its  members  could  not  have  sustained  growth  in  per  capita  output 
without  structural  change.  The  required  structural  changes  cover 33 
the  whole  gamut  of  deficiencies  in  institutional  arrangements  and 
government  policies  in  developing  countries  that  economists  have 
found  to  obstruct  economic  progress  during  the  past  few  decades. 
Balance  of  payments  equilibrium  and  growth  are  closely  related: 
there  cannot  be  sustained  growth  without  the  conditions  for  long- 
term  balance  of  payments  equilibrium.  During  the  past  decade  and 
a half,  the  Bank  has  made  an  increasing  number  of  structural 
adjustment  loans  (SALs),  which  currently  constitute  more  than  one 
third  of  the  Bank's  lending.  SALs  provide  a means  for  the  Bank 
to  influence  a country's  broad  development  policies  and  evolving 
institutional  structure  in  a way  that  it  cannot  do  through 
project  and  program  loans.  The  Bank  releases  portions  of  an  SAL, 
according  to  the  degree  to  which  the  borrowing  country  is 
carrying  out  conditions  set  forth  in  the  loan  agreement. 
The  IMF  tends  to  emphasize  monetary,  fiscal  and  exchange 
rate  policies  in  its  SAFs,  while  the  Bank's  SALs  give  greater 
emphasis  to  allocating  capital  among  economic  sectors.  Both 
institutions  seek  to  promote  a combination  of  governmental 
policies  and  institutional  changes  that  are  closely  inter- 
related.  Not  only  is  there  considerable  overlap  between  the  Fund 
and  Bank  in  these  operations,  in  a  few  cases  there  is  actual 
conflict  in  the  agreements  with  individual  countries  negotiated 
by  the  institutions.  Therefore,  some  critics  have  argued  that 
the  Fund  and  Bank  should  not  be  engaged  in  providing  development 
assistance.  As  stated  by  Gustav  Ranis,  "the  Bank  used  to 
concentrate  on  projects,  leaving  balance  of  payments  iss,ues and 34 
related  macro  advice  to  the  IMF.  . .it has  lately  become 
increasingly  difficult  to  tell  the  difference  between  the  two 
institutionsV1  (Ranis,  1994,  p.  C75).  George  Schultz  (1995,  pp. 
5-6)  states  that  "the  overlapping  activities  of  the  Bank  and 
Fund,  a change  in  the  traditional  mission  of  the  IMF,  and  the 
need  to  use  scarce  resources  carefully  all  argue  for  a merger  of 
these  institutions.11  Schultz  would  put  the  functions  of  the  Fund 
into  the  Bank. 
Fund  officials  insist  its  SAFs  are  not  development  aid 
because  the  financing  promotes  balance  of  payments  adjustment 
rather  than  development.  This  is  largely  semantics  because  of 
the  close  relationship  between  a healthy  balance  of  payments  and 
sustainable  development.  The  argument  might  have  been  more 
credible  when  the  Fund's  assistance  took  the  form  of  supple- 
menting  international  reserves  in  order  to  deal  with  short-term 
or  cyclical  short-falls  in  foreign  exchange  income.  The  SAFs  are 
designed  to  correct  basic  structural  defaults  in  a country's 
economy. 
The  Bretton  Woods  Commission  Report  opposed  merging  the 
institutions  on  the  grounds  that  the  Fund  can  provide  unique 
services  to  developing  countries  (Polak,  1994).  Nevertheless, 
the  Report  recognizes  the  need  for  a more  clearly  defined 
division  of  labor.  The  Report  recommends  that  the  Fund  "focus 
squarely  on  short-term  macroeconomic  stabilization"  and  "the  Bank 
should  not  duplicate  the  Fund's  macroeconomic  analysis,  but 
should  rely  on  it  in  its  program  planning  and  project  design. 35 
The  Fund,  in turn,  should  depend  on  the  WBG  to  provide  financial 
and  technical  assistance  to  recipient  countries,  to  mitigate  the 
impact  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  on  the  poor  and  the 
environment."  The  Commission  was  concerned  that  duplication  of 
effort  could  become  a serious  problem  "when  a country's  financial 
imbalance  is  structural  and,  therefore,  longer  term  in  nature." 
In  these  cases,  the  Fund  "should  not  pursue  independent  programs, 
but  its  macroeconomic  advice  should  become  part  of  a  longer-term 
adjustment  strategy  led  by  the  World  Bank  GrouptV  (Bretton  Woods 
Commission,  1994b,  p.  B-19).  In  stating  that  the  Fund  should 
focus  on  "short-term  macroeconomic  stabilizationl'  the  Commission 
report  appears  to  be  saying  that  the  Fund  should  not  make  SAFs, 
since,  by  definition,  they  are  structural  in  nature  and  not 
limited  to  short-term  financial  stability.  Another  question  is 
whether  the  Fund's  short-term  stabilization  assistance  is 
sufficiently  unique  to  justify  the  existence  of  such  a  large 
specialized  institution. 
A  complete  merger  of  the  Fund  with  the  WBG  would  require 
either  redrafting  the  charters  of  both  institutions,  or 
terminating  the  Fund  and  restructuring  the  Bank.  U.S. 
Legislative  approval  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  obtain.  The 
easiest  way  to  accomplish  a merger  of  their  current  activities 
would  be  to  bring  the  Fund  into  the  WBG  as  a separate  entity, 
similar  to  the  IFC.  Integrating  the  Fund  and  WBG  could  be 
accomplished  by  having  a single  set  of  executive  directors  for 
the  two  organizations,  with  each  director  serving  both 36 
institutions.  (This  is,  in  fact,  the  case  with  the  Boards  of 
Governors  of  the  Fund  and  the  Bank  since  they  are  the  ministers 
of  finance  of  the  member  countries.  The  task  of  integrating 
research  staffs  and  administrative  bureaucracies  would  be  left  to 
the  joint  executive  board  and  the  president  of  the  Bank  (who 
might  also  be  the  Managing  Director  of  the  Fund),  but  the  funding 
for  the  two  institutions  could  remain  as  presently  provided  in 
their  charters.  This  could  be  done  through  a  simple  amendment  to 
the  charters. 
The  Fund's  New  Role  in  Crisis  Prevention  -- 
The  Halifax  Summit  of  the  G-7  countries  (June  15-17,  1995) 
proposed  a new  role  for  the  Fund  in  dealing  with  financial  crisis 
prevention  and  emergency  assistance.  The  proposal  provides  for 
(I)  "an  early  warning  system,"  including  the  publication  of  key 
economic  and  financial  data;  (2)  increased  surveillance  and 
policy  advice  to  governments;  and  (3)  an  emergency  financing 
mechanism  which  would  provide  "faster  access  to  Fund  arrangements 
with  strong  conditionality  and  large  up-front  disbursements  in 
crisis  situationsV1  (IMF,  1995).  To  enhance  the  Fund's  resources 
for  emergency  financing,  the  Halifax  Summit  communique  requested 
that  wealthier  nations  double  the  $28  billion  now  available  to 
the  Fund  under  the  General  Agreement  to  Borrow  (GAB),  and,  in 
addition,  suggested  that  consideration  be  given  to  increasing  IMF 
quotas. 
The  Halifax  proposal  was  initiated  by  the  U.S.  government  as 
a response  to  the  Mexican  financial  crisis  of  December  1994, 37 
which  led  to  the  mobilization  of  some  $50  billion  in credits  for 
the  Mexican  government.  Of  this  amount,  about  $20  billion  was 
made  available  from  the  U.S.  Treasury  Stabilization  Fund,  $18 
billion  from  the  IMF,  and  the  remainder  from  other  countries. 
Because  NAFTA  had  recently  been  negotiated  and  its  success  was 
very  important  to  the  Clinton  Administration,  the  Administration 
had  a strong  incentive  to  assist  the  Mexican  economy  and  moderate 
the  decline  in  the  peso.  If  such  a  crisis  had  occurred  in 
Argentina  or  Venezuela,  would  the  U.S.  government  have  provided 
such  a  large  aid  package  and  urged  the  Fund  to  provide  a similar 
amount? 
The  Fund  has  responded  to  financial  crises  before,  but  never 
in  such  large  amounts  for  an  emergency  created  by  massive  private 
capital  withdrawals.  The  Fund's  Articles  of  Agreement 
specifically  prohibit  members  from  making  use  of  Fund  resources 
"to  meet  a  large  or  sustained  outflow  of  capital,  and  the  Fund 
may  request  a member  to  exercise  controls  to  prevent  such  uses  of 
the  resources  of  the  Fund"  (IMF,  Art.  VI,  Sect.  1).  However,  in 
recent  years  many  developing  countries  have  freed  their  capital 
markets  from  controls,  thereby  exposing  them  to  sudden  capital 
outflows,  with  a consequent  draining  of  the  country's  foreign 
exchange  reserves  and  threatening  the  country's  ability  to  meet 
both  private  and  official  debt  obligations.  The  country's 
official  reserves  may  also  be  depleted  if  the  central  bank 
attempted  to  support  the  currency  in  a period  of  capital  outflow. 38 
The  Halifax  Summit  proposal  does  not  affect  the  system  of 
international  payments  represented  by  the  major  currencies,  but 
it  does  address  the  risk  inherent  in  the  global  capital  market, 
which  now  include  many  developing  countries.  In  appraising  this 
role  for  the  Fund,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  whether  increased 
Fund  surveillance  and  the  requirement  that  countries  make  public 
all  the  relevant  information  on  their  current  financial  condition 
will  reduce  the  incidence  of  crisis,  and  whether  a  large  aid 
package  following  a crisis  is the  most  beneficial  use  of  public 
international  capital.  Mexico  received  economic  assistance  from 
and  scrutiny  by  the  Fund  before  the  December  1994  crisis,  a 
factor  which  raises  the  question  of  whether  the  Fund  can  provide 
an  effective  early  warning  system.  In  fact,  in  1994  the  Fund 
held  consultations  with  Mexico  shortly  before  the  crisis,  and 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  Fund  advised  depreciation  of  the 
peso  or  other  changes  in Mexico's  financial  policies  (IMP,  1994, 
P-  81).  Will  foreign  investors  become  less  cautious  if  they  rely 
on  the  Fund  to  warn  them  of  risky  conditions  and  bail  them  out  if 
the  country  in which  they  are  investing  is  faced  with  default? 
Will  countries  be  willing  to  borrow  more  on  international  capital 
markets  if they  know  the  Fund  provides  a safety  net  to  avoid 
default?  Private  capital  imports  do  not  necessarily  finance 
productive  investment  that  will  strengthen  a country's  balance  of 
payments  position.  Should  the  Fund's  resources  be  used  to 
encourage  and,  in  effect,  guarantee  external  debts  incurred  by 
loans  which  may  not  have  been  used  for  productive  purposes? 39 
Clearly,  countries  receiving  assistance  should  make  available  to 
the  public  all  relevant  information  on  their  financial  condition. 
Given  this  information,  should  not  external  creditors  be  able  to 
evaluate  their  risks  and  not  count  on  emergency  aid  from  the  Fund 
to  avoid  losses  from  defaults? 
There  is  a question  as  to  how  the  "early  warning  system" 
would  work.  Who  would  be  warned  and  when?  As  soon  as  the  world 
financial  community  receives  a warning  that  a country  is  facing 
financial  difficulty,  a massive  capital  outflow  is  likely  to 
occur,  in which  case  crisis  prevention  would  be  out  of  the 
question.  What  would  the  emergency  assistance  be  used  for?  If 
it  is  used  to  enable  the  country  to  meet  its  external  debts, 
there  is  no  decrease  in  total  indebtedness  and  no  new  productive 
capital.  Only  if  the  capital  outflow  were  reversed  could  the 
Fund  be  repaid  within  a short  period,  but  this  is by  no  means 
assured.  If  the  external  creditors  were  not  immediately  repaid, 
what  would  be  the  affect  of  a  large  additional  obligation  on  the 
credit  standing  of  the  country?  How  could  emergency  credits 
improve  the  current  account  balance  given  the  additional  debt 
service  obligations?  These  questions  were  not  satisfactorily 
answered  in the  G-7  proposal. 
Proposal  for  a New  Allocation  of  SDRs 
Included  in the  multilateral  sources  of  financial  assistance 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  IMF  is  the  allocation  of  SDRs. 
There  is  strong  support  by  the  Managing  Director  of  the  IMF  for 
creating  more  SDRs.  One  argument  is  that  new  IMF  members  that 40 
missed  the  earlier  allotments  should  be  provided  with  SDRs.  This 
suggests  that  somehow  SDRs  are  an  entitlement,  which  should  be 
made  available  to  the  former  Soviet  Bloc  countries  recently 
joining  the  Fund.  The  original  argument  for  SDRs  was  that  a 
shortage  of  international  reserves  would  limit  world  trade. 
Those  opposing  point  out  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  any 
relationship  between  world  aggregate  reserves  and  the  volume  of 
world  trade.  The  idea  that  global  reserves  may  at  times  be 
inadequate  originated  during  the  early  post-war  period  when 
dollars  and  gold  were  the  bulk  of  the  international  reserves. 
The  so-called  "dollar  shortage"  disappeared  in  the  1960s. 
Currently,  there  are  several  major  currencies  serving  this 
function  and  there  is  certainly  no  shortage  of  convertible 
currencies  held  by  central  banks  of  the  world.  In  addition, 
central  banks  have  negotiated  agreements  for  borrowing  large  sums 
from  one  another.  Shortage  of  reserves  is  an  individual  country 
problem,  not  a world  problem.  A  general  expansion  of  SDRs  is  a 
poor  form  of  foreign  aid.  It  is  neither  targeted  to  specific 
purposes  nor  countries  in  need.  Expanding  the  total  volume  of 
international  liquidity  serves  no  global  function  and  might 
contribute  to  world  inflation. 41 
Problems  Created  bv  Liauidatina  the  IMF 
If  the  IMF  were  liquidated,  a number  of  problems  would 
arise.  First,  all  179  members  of  the  Fund  count  as  a part  of 
their  international  monetary  reserves  their  reserve  positions  in 
the  Fund  (totalling  $52.9  billion  as  of  FY  1995)  and  their 
holdings  of  SDRs  (totalling  $31.6  billion).  Although  these 
amounts  are  small  compared  to  total  reserve  assets  in  excess  of  a 
trillion-and-a-half  dollars,  they  represent  $13.5  billion  in 
reserves  for  developing  countries.  Liquidating  the  Fund  would 
eliminate  these  reserves.  Such  a  liquidation  would  involve 
repayment  of  gold  and  current  subscriptions  made  by  member 
countries.  In order  to  repay  these  subscriptions,  countries 
would  need  to  repay  obligations  to  the  Fund  totalling  $58  billion 
as  of  FY  1995.  Many  developing  countries  are  dependent  on  new 
IMF  credits  to  meet  their  repayments  on  old  credits.  In 
addition,  the  Fund  has  made  commitments  under  standby  and  SAF 
agreements,  which  would  probably  be  honored,  but  could  not  be 
renewed.  Liquidating  the  Fund  would  also  mean  that  members  would 
no  longer  be  obligated  to  accept  SDRs  in payment  of  debts. 
However,  there  would  need  to  be  some  way  of  compensating 
countries  holding  SDRs  in  excess  of  their  initial  allotments. 
Such  compensation  would  need  to  come  from  those  countries  (mainly 
developing)  that  spent  all  or  a portion  of  their  SDR  allotments. 
The  net  use  of  SDRs  by  members  totalled  nearly  $13  billion  as  of 
FY  1995.  Countries  would  need  to  pay  this  amount  to  buy  back  the 42 
SDRs  they  used  over  and  above  their  initial  allotments. 
The  IMF  could  not  be  rapidly  liquidated  without  creating 
financial  crises  for  a number  of  developing  countries,  especially 
those  with  debt  servicing  problems.  It would  require  at  least  a 
decade  and  probably  longer  during  which  time  some  loans  would 
need  to  be  made  to  avoid  crises.  One  approach  to  phasing  out  the 
Fund  would  be  a gradual  reduction  in  the  number  of  countries 
eligible  to  draw  on  its  resources.  This  has  been  occurring  as 
members,  such  as  Korea,  approach  the  economic  status  of  developed 
countries.  Eligibility  to  use  the  resources  of  the  Fund  might  be 
limited  to  those  countries  that  are  poorest  and  most  in  need. 
Alternatively,  eligibility  might  be  limited  to  those  countries 
that  are  most  likely  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  Fund's  resources 
for  achieving  growth  and  long-term  balance  of  payments 
equilibrium.  If  the  Fund  made  eligibility  for  credits  depend  on 
the  first  criterion,  it would  be  less  able  to  repay  its 
subscribers  than  under  the  second  criterion.  In  either  case,  the 
Fund's  unpaid  obligations  are  likely  to  be  substantial.  However, 
so  long  as  the  Fund  is  not  terminated,  there  would  be  no  losses 
by  member  countries  holding  SDRs  and  reserve  positions  in  the 
Fund.[3]  This  might  dampen  enthusiasm  for  liquidating  the  Fund! Conclusions 
1.  I do not favor the establishment  of an international 
monetary  order based on an agreement  among the major financial 
powers to maintain  a set of target exchange rates or ranges 
within which the rates would move through coordinated  exchange 
market  intervention  and monetary  and fiscal policies.  I have 
reached this conclusion  for three reasons.  First, I do not 
believe  it is possible  for the G-7 countries to reach agreement 
on a set of target rates and current account balances they would 
be willing to support.  Second,  I do not believe that the United 
States or most of the other G-7 countries would be willing to 
subordinate  domestic objectives  to the stabilization  of exchange 
rates in situations where these objectives  are in conflict. 
Third,  I have serious doubts whether G-7 countries with the 
support of the IMF can be successful  in selecting  a set of target 
exchange rates that would be compatible with both the current 
account balances they could agree on balance of payments 
equilibrium  for each country.  The macroeconomic  conditions  for 
maintaining  any set of exchange rates that would satisfy these 
goals are continually  changing,  and stabilization  efforts would 
continuously  be thwarted by developments  that would render the 
rates inappropriate.  Except for emergency situations  brought on 
by global shocks or crises in individual countries where 
temporary  financial coordination  for influencing exchange rates 
might be beneficial,  exchange rates should be determined  by free 
markets without multilateral  management. 4.4. 
2.  I reject  the  proposal  for  a substantial  increase  in  the 
resources  of  the  Fund  for  emergency  assistance  in  dealing  with 
financial  crises.  The  Fund  should  provide  stricter  and  more 
comprehensive  surveillance  for  those  countries  making  use  of  its 
resources,  and  should  insist  that  all  information  relevant  for  an 
analysis  of  a country's  financial  outlook  be  made  public  with  a 
minimum  of  delay.  However,  funds  for  public  international 
assistance  are  scarce  and  should  be  used  mainly  for  reducing 
world  poverty  and  promoting  broadly-based  development.  Large 
amounts  of  financial  assistance  for  preventing  defaults  and  stabilizing 
capital  markets  is  unlikely  to  promote  these  objectives. 
3.  The  Fund's  very  limited  contributions  to  the 
international  monetary  system  do  not  warrant  continuing  an 
institution  of  this  size.  For  more  than  two  decades  the  Fund  has 
functioned  almost  solely  to  assistance  and  advise  developing 
countries,  and  much  of  these  activities  duplicate  those  of  the 
W3G.  I believe  the  Fund  should  be  merged  with  the  WBG,  and  its 
personnel,  policies  and  administration  closely  integrated  with 
those  of  the  World  Bank.  I do  not  believe  the  current  functions 
of  the  Fund  are  sufficiently  unique  to  warrant  its  continuation 
as  an  independent  institution.  However,  an  immediate  liquidation 
of  the  Fund  would  create  serious  financial  problems  for  many 
developing  countries,  and  its  liquidation  should  require  a period 
of  at  least  a decade  and  possibly  longer,  while  operating  within 
the  framework  of  the  WBG.  Because  of  the  problems  in 
renegotiating  the  Fund's  Articles  of  Agreement,  I suggest  that 4 5 
the  capital  structure  and  sources  of  funds  for  the  Fund  remain  as 
presently  constituted,  but  that  its  policies  be  determined  by  a 
joint  board  of  executive  directors  in which  each  director  would 
serve  as  the  executive  directors  of  both  the  Bank  and  the  Fund. 
Both  insitutions  should  be  under  the  general  management  of  the 
president  of  the  Bank.  Since  the  Fund's  Articles  call  for  the 
appointment  of  a managing  director,  this  position  could  be  held 
as  a  joint  appointment  by  the  president  of  the  Bank.  The  Boards 
of  Governors  of  the  Fund  and  Bank  appoint  both  the  President  of 
the  Bank  and  the  Managing  Director  of  the  Fund.  The  two  Boards 
are  already  integrated:  in  almost  all  cases,  the  Governors  are 
Ministers  of  Finance  of  the  member  countries. 
4.  The  Fund's  responsibility  for  administering  the 
provisions  of  the  Articles  of  Agreement  on  exchange  restrictions 
and  multiple  exchange  rates  should  be  transferred  to  the  WTO, 
since  these  rules  are  the  financial  counterpart  of  the  GATT  rules 
on  trade  restrictions  and  subsidies.  This  function  would  be 
taken  over  by  the  WTO  since  it  is  generally  related  to  the  GATT 
trade  rules. 4.6 
Although  all  179  members  of  the  Fund  hold  reserve  positions 
in  the  Fund  in  SDRs  as  part  of  their  assets,  these  assets 
represent  only  5 percent  of  their  total  reserves.  Since  the 
Fund's  very  limited  contributions  to  the  international  monetary 
system  scarcely  warrants  continuing  an  institution  with  a  $200 
billion  budget  and  a  first-rate  research  staff,  (including  many 
of  the  world's  most  prominent  economists),  the  question  of 
whether  the  Fund  should  be  maintained  indefinitely  as  an 
independent  institution  depends  almost  entirely  upon  an 
evaluation  of  its  contributions  to  developing  countries,  and 
those  former  Soviet  bloc  nations  in  the  process  of  transition  to 
free  economies. 
The  issue  of  whether  the  Fund's  current  activities  in 
assisting  developing  countries  and  Eastern  European  countries  in 
transition,  depends  upon  whether  these  activities  justify  the 
existence  of  such  a  large  institution  and  whether  the  Fund's 
assistance  could  be  provided  more  efficiently  if merged  with  the 
WBG.  I question  whether  the  Fund's  assistance  to  developing 
countries  is  unique  enough  to  be  handled  by  the  Fund  as  an 
independent  institution,  especially  since  a substantial  portion 
of  the  assistance  provided  is  quite  similar  and  closely  related 
to  that  provided  by  the  WBG.  I have  argued  that  balance  of 
payments  assistance,  which  now  goes  well  beyond  temporary 
supplements  to  member  country  reserves,  is  indistinguishable  from 
development  aid  and  should,  therefore,  be  provided  by  a  single 
institution.  However,  the  new  proposed  role  for  the  Fund, References 
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